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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The poor living conditions and inescapable poverty in the less developed states after the World 
War II prompted the emergence of development relations between the ‘First World’ and ‘Third 
World’ (Willis & Kumar 2009). These relations focused on the economic, social and political 
progress of the Southern states towards conditions and a modernity that was similar to that of the 
Northern states (ibid).Since then, there has been increasing relations between these states in order 
to eradicate poverty and hunger, promote equality, ensure sustainable development, and improve 
health conditions. Even though poverty eradication is seen as the main purpose of aid, the donors 
may have different approaches to how they shape their aid policies according to the economic 
situations and the norms that are prominent in their countries (Desai 2009, Lancaster 2007). Sub-
Saharan Africa, the poorest and least developed region in the world, has been an important territory 
for development aid policies of many aid donors, such as the United States, China and the 
European Union (EU) (Scheipers & Sicurelli 2008, Brown 2005). Most of the states in this very 
large territory are conflict ridden, struck with famine and poverty (Scheipers & Sicurelli 2008), 
lack accountability of institutions and feature high levels of corruption (Knack & Bräutigam 2004). 
This project will investigate the elements that shape and direct EU’s development aid policies 
towards Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The EU’s development cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa began in 1957 with the Treaty of 
Rome, and then was furthered in 1963 with the Yaoundé convention, which was signed by the 18 
newly independent African states and the 6 member states of the European Economic Community 
at the time (Woolcock 2012). The agreement aimed to provide technical, trade and financial 
cooperation to the African states and was later on replaced by Lomé (1975) conventions and the 
Cotonou agreement (2000) (Malik 2011). The cooperation is funded by the European Development 
Fund (EDF) (European Commission 2014 [hereafter: EC 2014]). This fund is negotiated by the 
signatories in the agreements which are the recipient states and the individual member states of 
the EU - and then administered by the Commission (ibid.).  
 
Over time, these policies grew to cover larger territories, with the addition of the Caribbean and 
Pacific island states in 1975. Even though the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP) 
were former-colonies or dependent territories of the EU members, 'the sizes, locations, political 
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set-ups, cultures, racial groups and stages of development' differed (ibid., p. 124). However, in 
order to ‘jointly negotiate and implement cooperation agreements’, the EU has been involved with 
the ACP states as a whole (ibid., p. 124). The development cooperation policies of the EU with 
the ACP is ‘the most comprehensive, covering both trade and aid, and the oldest’ (Dearden & 
Salama 2002, p. 899). 
 
The EU’s commitment to promoting sustainable development through aid has been established 
and stated on many occasions. Various conventions, agreements and declarations have shaped the 
shared vision that guides EU’s development aid since the first Yaoundé. As the security driven 
strategies especially in Africa lost relevance with the end of the Cold War and the bipolarity of the 
world, there were increased demands for peace and liberty to be spread by the donors in 1990s 
(Olsen 1998; Brown 2005). The aid donors began voicing their concern for values such as political 
pluralism, respect for law, free economies, and later on ‘good governance’ as these were seen as 
fundamental to economic development. It was not long before the European Commission “came 
to support the international trend to replace ‘development’ with ‘democracy’ as one of the slogans 
of its development assistance in the 1990s” (Olsen 1998, p. 344). Openness for transition towards 
democracy was expressed as a condition for granting assistance (Brown 2005). Amending the 
treaties of Maastricht and Rome, Treaty of Lisbon (2007) is considered to be the EU’s legislation 
towards the developing world (Bountagkidis et al. 2015). The values that the EU identifies as 
essential for development can be extracted from this treaty, along with the European Consensus 
on Development (2006). Specifically in the Consensus on Development (ECoD) the EU expresses 
the complementary objectives of “promotion of good governance and respect for human rights”, 
along with “achieving a balance between activities aimed at human development, the protection 
of natural resources and economic growth and wealth creation to benefit the poor” in its battle 
against poverty (europa.euD 2007). Such values have formed the basis of some of the later 
agreements, e.g. Cotonou, and the revisions of Lomé. These agreements also feature political 
conditionality in order to establish the aforementioned values in the recipient states (Biondo 2011).  
 
At this point in analyzing the driving factors for the EU to promote norms through political 
conditionality in aid policies, two approaches to the EU’s international role become relevant for 
our project: Normative power Europe by Ian Manners (2002) and Market power Europe by Chad 
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Damro (2012). The former argues for the normative basis of the EU and its ability to shape what 
is ‘normal’ globally (Manners 2002), while the latter claims that the EU gains its power through 
the market, and its regulatory strengths to externalize internal policies (Damro 2012). Manners 
(2002) identifies 5 core and 4 minor norms which he claims are at the centre of internal and external 
EU relations: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms (core), social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good 
governance (minor) . These principles are applied to different realities by the EU without use of 
force, but rather with the power of ideas (Manners 2008). Damro (2012), on the other hand, argues 
that the EU has the ability to liberalize or restrict the market through its regulations, also in its 
external relations. Its regulatory capability and institutional qualities allows the EU to externalize 
its market standards, making the non-EU targets abide by the policies required by them. The 
regulatory authorities impose sanctions on and provide incentives for the developing countries that 
satisfy EU standards (ibid.). Since these regulatory institutions are open to many different interest 
groups, regulations that serve these groups’ interests can emerge in market policies (Damro 2012).  
 
1.1 Problem Area 
Different theoretical approaches, realism, liberalism and idealism, identify alternate incentives to 
provide aid in international relations (Bountagkidis et al. 2015). Strategic political and economic 
interests that the donor countries bear in mind when providing aid, such as security considerations 
or trade policies, can be the underlying motives (ibid.). The NGOs lobbying for aid, political  
parties, local institutions, domestic conditions and the political structure can also affect the 
allocation and provision of aid (ibid.). The objective to increase the welfare for people in places 
with less human and social development demonstrate the immaterial motivation behind aid (ibid.).  
 
The development aid relations between the EU and the ACP has been going through changes over 
a near 60 year time span, and there are several different ways to interpret it. Initially seen as a 
continuation of colonial ties, then a strategic concern during the intense superpower competition 
of the Cold War, the EU’s post-1990 aid seems to move in a different direction (Malik 2011, 
Brown 2005). Taking up a prominent place in the working of international relations in the last 20 
years, the EU incorporates norms that it considers essential for development into its aid policies 
(Arts & Dickson 2006). Norms such as ‘respect for human rights, promotion of democracy and 
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good governance, protection of natural resources and economic growth’ that have been identified 
in the European Consensus on Development and increasingly featured as conditionalities in more 
recent agreements, represent the EU as normative power. However, some studies demonstrate an 
inconsistency of the EU policies for e.g. democratization or good governance if they conflict with 
EU’s political/historical, economic, security interests (Biondo 2011). The inconsistent 
conditionalities imposed on the poorer and strategically less important Sub-Saharan African states 
imply that the priority may be put on the market expansion and trade relations of the EU. The 
interplay between the strategic or economic donor interests and the allocation of aid raise the 
question on the commitment to the promotion of the aforementioned normative values, which 
portrays a more idealistic approach to aid: the moral obligation and immaterial motivations. This 
leads us to our research question.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
● To what extent are the European Union’s development aid policies to Sub-Saharan Africa 
shaped by its normative or market interests? 
 
Our research has been guided by the following working questions:  
- In what ways are the EU’s normative and market interests present in aid relations between 
the EU and Sub Saharan Africa? 
- When and how did the EU’s normative values emerge in aid policies? 
- What are the conditionalities in aid relations?  
- Has the EU been committed to the implementation of normative values? 
 
1.3 List of Abbreviations & Clarification of Concepts 
ACP   African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
Commission  European Commission 
Community  European Community 
DAC   Development Assistance Committee of the OECD 
EDF   European Development Fund 
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EU   European Union 
EC    European Commission 
EEC    European Economic Community 
EP   European Parliament 
FDI                              Foreign Direct Investment 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa 
MPE   Market Power Europe 
NPE   Normative Power Europe 
OCT   Overseas Countries and Territories 
ODA   Official Development Assistance 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 
 
European Union (EU):  The European Union will be approached as an entity, rather than a forum 
of the member states. When referring to early treaties, the appropriate institution will be referred 
to (e.g. European Economic Community, European Community). When talking about the EU in 
general, or developments over a long time, European Union will be used. Statements, legislation 
etc. which has been approved within the different pillars of the EU are to be considered as 
representing the EU. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: We will be working with a definition of Sub-Saharan Africa as the African 
countries included in the ACP group. 
 
Aid: Aid may refer to any type of grant given from one country (usually developed and in the 
Northern hemisphere) to another country (usually developing and in the Southern hemisphere) 
(Desai 2009). In this project aid will be synonymous with development aid. Thus, we are not 
concerned with humanitarian aid, nor military aid. 
 
EU foreign aid Group 25 Spring 2015 
9 
 
Development: Development can be defined as a process of economic, social and political 
progress, or the support from a developed country to a “Third World” country towards such 
progress (Willis and Kumar, 2009).  
 
1.4 Outline of Project 
As we have introduced our problem area and research question in this chapter; the following two 
chapters focus on the theoretical standpoints, methods and the research approach we engage in 
throughout the project. The theory chapter initially elaborates on Normative Power Europe 
(Manners) and Market Power Europe (Damro) approaches to the EU’s international actorness, then 
provides the reader with how they will be operationalized in our project. We then move on to the 
methodology section in order to explain our train of thought while distinguishing between the 
sources that will be analysed in the project, and also the methods used for analysis.  
 
The consecutive chapters constitute our project’s analysis and discussion. The chapter titled 
“European Union Development Aid” explains the development aid provided by the EU from a 
historical perspective, identifying the emergence of norms in aid policies and agreements between 
the EU and SSA. The European Consensus on Development will also be analysed in this chapter, 
as it is the shared vision by the member states that guides the EU’s development policies. In the 
chapter that follows we will narrow our scope to Cotonou, the latest of the cooperation agreements, 
and analyse the aid relations between the EU and SSA. Having provided the reader with 
information on EU aid and the guidelines that shape it in the earlier chapter, it will be possible to 
identify and discuss the conditions imposed on the SSA states to be eligible for receiving aid and 
how these conditions are presented in the Cotonou agreement. The chapter will go through several 
articles in order to identify objectives, principles and conditions that are present in these relations.  
 
In chapter 6 we will look into the EU’s commitment to aid policies, represented by the condition 
of democracy promotion and the inconsistency in the enforcement of this condition. We will go 
through explanations identified by scholars, including economic and security interests as well as 
concerns on aid effectiveness, and conclude on what this might show about EU’s interests in aid 
policies. Then we will move on to the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 - Theory 
2.1 Selection of Theory 
 In 2002 Ian Manners published the paper Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? 
in the Journal of Common Market Studies and in 2012 Chad Damro published Market power 
Europe in the Journal of European Public Policy. Throughout time there have been several 
approaches to understanding the power of the European Union. The two papers contributed with 
two new approaches of understanding the power of the European Union. The common view was 
for a long time to divide power into military and civilian power (Manners 2002, page 238); civilian 
power being any power that does not use military means. However, other approaches focus less 
on the means (that is what the EU says and does) and more on the identity of the EU as a multi 
level governance system (Manners 2002 & Damro 2012). Yet, conceptions of power are still about 
the ability to exercise it according to Manners, which is seen in his comparison of civilian, military 
and normative power (Manners 2002). Damro explains his Market Power Europe (MPE) theory as 
a contrast to Manners Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory. Damro does not neglect the 
possibility that EU may have normative characteristics, but due to three central characteristics: 
“material existence, institutional features and interest contestation”, he argues the EU as an 
international actor gains its power through the market (Damro 2012: 682). 
  
There are three different theoretical approaches in the literature about aid; realism, idealism and 
liberalism. They all view the interests of giving aid differently. In this chapter, we connect NPE 
and MPE to idealism and liberalism. The realist tradition argues that governments’ interest in 
giving aid is shaped by national strategic political and economic interests and will be used partly 
in the project (Bountagkidis et al. 2015). From an idealist perspective, foreign aid is seen as 
altruistic and guided by immaterial motivations. Different from the realist perspective, idealists do 
not see that peace is held through the balance of power, but instead as originating from 
international institutional features and the respect for international law. Foreign aid is thus 
provided to countries with low human and social development with the objective of increasing the 
welfare for people. The idealists believe that foreign aid is a tool that can promote these objectives 
(ibid.). Liberalism is different from the two other approaches. Liberalism emphasizes the role of 
NGO’s, political parties and bureaucracies and thus see that the world system operates on several 
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different levels. These actors are seen as essential to understand the quality and quantity of aid 
(ibid.). Liberalism is also concerned with the promotion of democratic norms, governance, 
institutions and international public goods such as free trade, arms control and environmental 
protection (Badie 2011). Liberalism also sees institutional features as important in securing peace, 
but it also emphasize market interdependence as a tool for providing a sustained peace (ibid.).   
  
2.1.1 Normative Power Europe 
In his 2002 paper, Manners shows the meaning of NPE by comparing the three concepts, civilian, 
military and normative power, and how they exercise their power (shown below). Furthermore, 
Manners makes clear that EU’s normative basis solely does not make it a normative power, but 
the way norms are spread should also be taken into account for it to be a normative power (Manners 
2002, p. 244). 
  
Extract of: Table 1, Manners 2002, p. 240: 
Civilian Military Normative 
Ability to use civilian 
instruments 
Ability to use military 
instruments 
Ability to shape conceptions of 
‘normal’ 
  
Manners identifies 6 ways of ‘diffusion’ of the norms (that is ways of being able to spread the 
norms), which give the EU its normative power: contagion, informational, procedural, 
transference, overt and cultural filter (ibid., p. 244-245). 
Contagion is ‘unintentional’ diffusion, mainly the EU’s norms being spread because they set an 
example (ibid.). Informational diffusion stems from communications and declarations (ibid). 
Procedural diffusion happens through the interaction with another party which adapts to certain 
systems (ibid.). Transference is implemented via conditions, rewards and sanctions in relation to 
economic exchange; both trade and aid (ibid.). Overt diffusion happens because the EU (or its 
member states) are physically present in other countries (ibid.). The cultural filter affects “learning, 
adaption or rejection” of norms (ibid., p. 245). 
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Manners (2002) argues that an understanding of NPE can serve alongside conceptions of military 
and civilian power, and simply adds another dimension to the understanding. Normative power is 
about the power of ideas rather than the use of force (ibid., p. 238). Basically, the ability to shape 
conceptions of ‘normal’ puts the EU in a powerful position. In this way normative power is 
different from common conceptions of power to Manners, because he argues that the EU does not 
need to be willing to “use force in an instrumental way” (ibid., p. 242). The concept NPE is also 
exceptional because it does not focus on the EU’s similarity to a state (ibid., 239). 
 
Manners identifies 5 core norms and 4 minor norms which he shows are the ‘normative basis’ of 
EU as well as he shows how and when these norms came about and were explicitly expressed by 
the EU. (Manners 2002). The 5 core norms are: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The four suggested minor norms are social solidarity, 
anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. 
A commitment to place these norms at the centre of both internal and external EU relations has 
arisen (Manners 2002). 
 
Hyde-Price criticises the concept of normative (and civilian) power as he argues that the concepts 
are made from a liberal-idealist point of view, seeing the EU as a ‘force for good’ (Hyde-Price 
2006). Because the authors agree with and support the normative basis of the EU they are uncritical 
towards EU’s power (ibid.). This is linked to idealism, because it means that EU’s actions are 
carried out for altruistic purposes, and that the norms spread by normative power are superior. 
 
Manners has later made it clear that there is a difference between the normative identity and 
whether things are ethically “good” (Manners 2008). Manners argues that a normative power 
approach makes it possible to critically identify how the EU acts as well as to judge these actions 
(ibid.). A judgment on whether the EU’s actions are ethically good can be done by looking at 
whether the EU acts as a virtuous example, whether its actions themselves are carried out in the 
right way, and whether they chose the course with the most preferable consequences (ibid.).  
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2.1.2 Market Power Europe 
Damro argues the identity of the EU is historically and presently linked to the market (2012). In 
1951, the coal and steel sectors in several European countries were joined together as an 
experiment. Later on the Treaty of Rome from 1957 and the 1986 Single European Act increased 
the market to a broader focus. The external tariffs created an external dimension and made the 
internal market identity common among member states, thereby  pushing the European integration 
and identity forward (ibid.). Damro argues that the process from being a regional market 
experiment to a global actor in international politics has happened within the last twenty years, 
and the EU’s awareness of this has further strengthened the idea of the EU as market power (Damro 
2012). 
 
The concept of MPE does not intend to portray the EU as solely a neo-liberal and capitalist 
international actor. Despite its pro-market policies, the EU also encourages government 
interventions in the market (Damro 2012). The EU is a power that can and does use its market and 
regulatory strengths to externalize its internal policies (ibid). NPE sees liberty as the core norm of 
the EU (Manners 2002) which Damro views as including market freedom. He sees government 
interventions’ prominent role within the European market as being a contradiction to market 
freedom. The social and economic regulatory interventions counter the idea that EU is solely a 
free-market actor and thus act as a constraint on MPE’s market freedom (Damro 2012). 
 
The EU’s market identity has to be seen as explicitly linked to three important characteristics: 
material existence, institutional features and interest contestation, that are interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing each other (ibid.). 
 
The material existence is founded upon the European single market. The fact that EU’s market 
today is the world’s largest emphasizes the need to acknowledge the influence of the market when 
analyzing EU’s identity and power. The sheer size of the single market should make everyone take 
the single market seriously. 
“Even with only 7 percent of world population we still generate almost 22 percent of the 
world’s wealth. (This is compared to about 21 percent for the US, 11.5 percent for China 
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and 4.7 percent for India.) Together, we are the first commercial power in the world, 
bigger than the US, China or Japan” (Van Rompuy 2010: 5). 
The incentives of being a part of it or following European standards leads to possibilities for the 
EU to externalize its internal policies, both the regulatory and market-related. Other major 
economic actors within the international system can feel the EU’s market power, but not in same 
degree as lesser economic actors (ibid.). 
 
The second aspect of the conceptualization of MPE is the institutional features of EU. Damro sees 
the EU as a regulatory state that through its economic and social regulations either can liberalize 
or restrict the market as well as externalize the regulations to other countries. The EU is a generator 
of standards and to externalize its market standards, the EU relies on its institutional qualities and 
abilities as its regulatory capability (Damro 2012). 
 
The last component is the interest contestation. Because the EU’s regulatory institutions are open, 
many groups compete with each other for regulations that serve their interests. The EU’s 
regulations have the function of distributing costs and benefits throughout society, which means 
that the different interest groups lobbying about the internal regulations also play a role in the 
externalization of these regulations. The acknowledgement of the important roles of NGOs within 
the EU system is consistent with liberalism’s emphasis on NGOs as being a crucial part of the 
political system and process. These interest groups have interests in whether the externalization 
should be coercive or not, which can increase MPE unintentionally (Damro 2012). These three 
interacting components are important in understanding the identity of EU as MPE and why the EU 
is predisposed to act according to MPE. The components are also independent variables that all 
influence the externalization of market-related regulatory policies and if they grow so will MPE 
(Damro 2012). 
  
The market-related policies and regulatory measures are created internally as compromises 
between different actors. The targets of the externalization are mostly non-EU corporations, firms, 
states and multinational organizations. There are two stages of externalization. The first is the EU 
institutions’ and actors’ effort to make other actors incorporate market policies that satisfy the 
EU’s regulatory level within the European single market.  The second is making the non-EU targets 
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abide by the policies required by them (Damro 2012). The market-related policies and regulatory 
measures are made through political compromises between different public and private actors. 
These compromises mean that they might not be consistent with the collective core and minor 
norms of the EU. The two different stages of externalization look at both the attempts at and the 
actual success of the externalization (ibid.). In this project our focus will be on the attempts of 
externalization made by the EU and not the actual success. 
 
Means and tools are also necessary to understand MPE. The means can either be coercive or 
persuasive. “Smith (2003: 22) provides a useful distinction: ‘Coercion involves threatening or 
inflicting “punishment” ... persuasion entails co-operating with third countries to try to induce 
desired internal or external policy changes’” (cited in Damro 2012: 691). Regulatory actions by 
the EU can both be coercive and persuasive and are sometimes intertwined. In some cases, 
persuasive means might come off as coercive to the target. MPE sees these means as either 
negative or positive conditionality. The use of positive conditionality exists mostly of tools like 
providing more developmental aid, foreign direct investment, reducing tariffs, extending loans and 
other economic benefits. The negative conditionality tools can be embargos, boycotts, suspending 
or reducing developmental aid, which might harm the economy (ibid.). The externalization of MPE 
is exercised through tools as e.g. positive and negative conditionality, international legal 
instruments and internal regulatory measures which can  be targeted at both states and non-state 
actors (ibid.). 
 
To investigate externalization of MPE, it is useful to analyze what the EU says and what the EU 
does. What the EU says, is seen through different communications and documents concerned with 
market relations and regulations by the Commission, such as Single Market Review and Europe 
2020. Economic regulations is about the entry to the market and competition, while social 
regulation addresses negative externalities, such as pollution, and consumer protection (ibid.). 
 
The three regulatory institutional components in the EU can provide a foundation for unintentional 
externalization, but through the actions taken by these institutions, it can be clearly seen that the 
MPE’s externalization is intentional (Damro 2012). Unintentionality can also be a part of the 
externalization since EU’s market size and market standards attract non-EU actors (Damro 2012). 
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Despite this, the exercise of power through externalization is to be understood as primarily an 
intentional behavior (Damro 2012). 
  
It is clear that MPE and liberalism share several similarities other than its focus on NGOs. The 
general emphasis on externalization of market relations and policies is consistent with liberalism’s 
promotion of market values such as free trade. MPEs recognition of norms and values as part of 
the EU’s identity, as well as the importance of EU’s institutional features’ in externalization, fits 
well with liberalism’s wished promotion of e.g. democracy and institutions. 
 
2.2 Operationalization 
In relation to how the EU spreads its norms, we will focus on ‘transference’, ‘informational’ and 
‘procedural’ diffusion. Transference “takes place (..) through largely substantive or financial 
means” and includes aid (Manners 2002, p. 245). Informational diffusion results from strategic 
communications and declarations, while procedural diffusion takes place in “the 
institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party” (ibid., p. 244). As these 
modes of diffusion involves conditions in agreements, and declarations by the EU such as the 
ECOD, we find them relevant to our project (ibid.). These are the modes we will meet when 
working with agreements, as they are explicitly stated, while other modes require analysis of e.g. 
how the presence of the EU in a country affects norms, which is not within the scope of our 
analysis.  
  
In our approach of NPE we will not be using the exact same norms as Manners, as the norms he 
works with are identified in EU’s international relations in general. Because we work with the 
EU’s norms in aid, we will take our departure in the common values agreed upon in the European 
Consensus on Development as part of the development of EU’s foreign aid policy. These norms 
are similar to those identified by Manners, 6 of them being the same, including all 5 core norms.  
  
Damro is writing about MPE as a contrast to NPE. This contrast is useful for us in our work with 
normative values within aid because this theory provides us with an alternative understanding of 
EU’s external policies. MPE is a concept where we are able to apply specific tools and assumptions 
in our research on EU as a power. The three characteristics are essential to understand and analyze 
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the EU as a power because they explain when, where and how to exercise MPE, as well as 
clarifying why the EU is predisposed to act as MPE (Damro 2012). Damro believes the best way 
to answer the question of MPE versus NPE is to determine if the EU is more likely to externalize 
its core and minor norms or market-related policies and regulatory measures. One specific 
suggestion made by Damro is to use MPE with the compatibility of other conceptualization to 
answer in which ways normative justifications interact with material incentives (ibid.). This 
suggestion fits well with our research question and whether EU foreign aid is inclined to promote 
normative or market interests. The two theories will mainly be used as a general way of 
understanding the EU and how it can be seen in various agreements.   
Chapter 3 - Methodology  
In this chapter, we will present how we will perform the research and analysis. 
The chapter will begin by explaining our choice of method, secondly the selection of sources and 
data, and how these have been assessed, and in the end our research approach. 
 
3.1 Methods 
In order to answer our working questions, we will be using content analysis as a method.    
The following is based on the description of content analysis given by Hesse-Biber and Leavy 
(2011) pages 227-254:   
Content analysis is a method of data gathering that researchers use to analyze the things 
society produces, such as but not limited to government documents, press material, legal 
texts, advertisement campaigns. These give insight into social behaviours and processes, 
without interacting with the subjects of the research. It originated firstly as a quantitative 
method to deduce a trend in the portrayal of a topic or theme in a given type of text, by 
counting the use of words and images.   
However content analysis can also be used qualitatively e.g. by identifying the assumptions 
the text has, which may shed light on the ideology, values and interests; or performing a 
semiological analysis which acknowledges context. This would include the investigation 
of both the words and images in the content and the societal circumstances in which it had 
been produced, and how these are shaped and enforced by each other.   
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As an unobtrusive method that analyses products by people rather than interacting with 
them, content analysis has been praised by Prior for enabling the researcher to gain data 
even if the subjects are not willing to answer the questions (cited in Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 
2011, page 241). This means that the method is useful for understanding e.g. how a 
derogatory term is used in newspapers, rather than the feelings people have about the term. 
This does not exclude the researcher from investigating the effect of the content on society, 
for example by also conducting studies with interaction with people or by combining it 
with quantitative data on the effects.  
 
In our project, content analysis will be used mainly qualitatively and only with written text.  We 
will analyse the European Consensus on Development (2006) and the Cotonou agreement (2000) 
to identify how the interests of the European Union are portrayed, and which contradictions can 
be seen in the agreements. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) argue that content analysis is often a 
mixed method (using both qualitative and quantitative data). Simple counting will be applied in 
few instances and our main focus will be on which words are used to describe objectives and 
values. We will identify which worldviews lie behind the descriptions and reasonings of these. We 
shall compare the Cotonou agreement to the EU’s policies to find consistency and inconsistencies. 
We will not be using any audiovisual data, but only work with written text.   
 
Within the scope of our theoretical framework, it will be possible for us to determine how the 
normative and market interests of EU shape aid relations.   
Limitations to using this method are the constrained levels of diplomacy and the concern to the 
states’ sovereignties that are found in such documents, which might obscure the power relations 
behind the content. However, this can only be elucidated by featuring diverse and heavy literature, 
to gain insight into such power relations prior to the content analysis.   
  
3.2. Selection of sources   
Data triangulation will be applied throughout our project. Our use of different data sources 
increases the validity of our research results (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). In addition to that we 
will look at documents, journal articles and reports.  
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3.2.1 EU agreements & resolutions 
We will look into EU resolutions and agreements between EU and Sub-Saharan Africa. We have 
chosen the European Consensus on Development ratified in 2006 (hereafter Consensus or ECoD) 
and the latest ACP-EU agreement, the Cotonou agreement of 2000. We have only concerned 
ourselves with the final versions of these documents. We are aware that this excludes the 
considerations and disagreements between member states that have gone before this agreement, 
but since we are looking at the EU as an entity we are not concerned with member state policies. 
These documents and agreements are prepared and published by the participating sides’ official 
mediums, for instance European Commission’s webpage, therefore we will not be critical of their 
validity. We will apply content analysis, and attempt to show how the EU portrays its policies as 
well as the presence of values in its policies by analysing these sources. 
 
Resolutions and statements from the EU on aid policy 
We wanted to present the EU’s common aims for their aid policies via resolutions. We have 
selected the Consensus for this purpose. The Consensus is the first formal statement where the EU 
has agreed on common aims for development cooperation, and was a move towards policy 
coherence (Woolcock 2012). It identifies principles which the EU institution as well as the 
Member states will base their development policies on (EU consensus 2006). The Consensus 
identifies common principles which we see present in both Manner’s identification of EU core 
norms and in the conditions of aid policies (Manners 2002 and Cotonou 2000). 
  
Agreements between EU and SSA 
We will use agreements to investigate which specific conditions are connected to aid between EU 
and SSA and which interests can be identified. We have selected the Cotonou agreement to 
represent this. It is an agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
(ACP). It is the agreement currently in place, as it is valid from 2000-2020. As SSA is a part of 
the ACP and under the European Development Fund, policies are mainly governed under this 
agreement. Therefore it is relevant for an investigation of SSA-EU relations. For specific country 
examples, we will only use countries from the SSA. 
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3.2.2 Journal articles  
The sources mentioned under 3.2.1 will be complemented by Journal articles analysing the 
mentioned sources, as well as other similar sources.  
The journal articles will be used for descriptive writing as well as points in the analysis and guides 
for the research. In relation to the latter, the articles serve as a source of initial coding. Coding is 
the process of dividing data into segments and identifying general analytical concepts from this 
data (Hesse-Bieber and Leavy, 2011). The articles help us identify points to focus on in the content 
analysis, as well as expanding on our analysis and provide a link between e.g. the Cotonou 
agreement and general trends in EU policies.  
Our main concern in deciding which articles to use, will be whether the documents the articles 
include are the type we want (e.g. resolution instead of proposal, European commission instead of 
member state).  
 
Throughout our whole project, we will base our theoretical arguments mainly on two theoretical 
approaches: Normative power Europe and Market power Europe, mainly represented by the 
following two articles: Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? by Ian Manners and 
Market Power Europe by Chad Damro, and can be linked to idealist and liberal standpoints in 
international relations. 
These two articles represent each of the theories used for our research. We have chosen them 
because they are widely referenced by other scholars in the same field, which increases the 
reliability and validity of the articles, as well as indicating that they represent the theories. 
Supplementary literature on theory is mainly chosen from the bibliography of these two articles as 
well as an article which examines Manners’s (2002) is used. 
 
3.3 Research approach  
Our project will have a focus on the two theories market and normative power Europe. Our 
approach to these theories will be deductive. The deductive approach tests theories against data, 
while the inductive approach intends to produce theory from the data (Hesse-Biber, Leavy). In our 
project the working question should provide data and knowledge by which we would be able to 
answer our research question and thus figure out which of the theories is the most prominent in 
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the case of EU aid to SSA. We will not be using an inductive approach because we do not aim at 
generating new theory out of the data we find and analyze and because we already have two 
specific theories that guide our analysis. Inductive approach is primarily used in the critical strand 
and interpretive methodology, while the deductive is emphasized in the post-positivist 
methodology (ibid). Despite our use of a deductive approach, the methodology in the project is 
rather critical. The critical approach fits well with our project in the context of its emphasis on 
power relations. The critical stand consists of many different methodological and epistemological 
positions, but the most relevant approach in our project is the postmodern. Postmodernism suits 
the project because it examines the status of a dominant ideology and how the ideology is 
reproduced through different means (ibid). It is relevant to our project because we want to look at 
the prominence of two different policies in EU aid and how it is used to maintain a dominant 
ideology globally.  
  
The critical strand and a deductive approach can somewhat be seen as a contradiction. The critical 
strands criticize absolute truths while deductive approach tends to generate an absolute truth. In 
our project we do not wish to find an absolute truth, or determine which theory is “the right theory”, 
instead we want to figure out to what extend the theories can be applied in our research topic and 
how present the two theories are respectively in the question of aid. Therefore we believe the 
deductive approach and a critical strand complement each other in this project.  
  
3.4 Delimitations 
In our project, we have chosen to focus on Sub-Saharan Africa’s relation to EU. Even though the 
EU has been jointly dealing with ACP states since 1975, we took this direction because of the 
available research articles on the SSA territory and the link to norm promotion. The ACP-EU 
relations originated firstly with connections to SSA states, however, we recognize that the 
inclusion of the new states may affect EU’s standpoint and interests.  
 
We have set our level of analysis on the EU, and how its aid policies towards the Sub-Saharan 
territory are shaped. This means that we do not take into account individual interests of EU member 
states and how these shape the EU’s common policy. Even though we collect some cases from the 
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SSA states, our focus is not on the aid recipients and the domestic conditions that influence the aid 
either.   
 
We have chosen the documents Cotonou agreement and European Consensus on Development for 
our analysis, as we saw them as the most relevant and up to date for our level of analysis. This 
meant missing out on bilateral agreements under Cotonou (EPAs), and resolutions by the EU. The 
negotiations between EU-ACP states, or the lobbying between member states and/or NGOs in the 
EU could provide us with a better insight to the interests that shape aid relations.  
 
We have chosen to limit ourselves to the time span from when the EU-ACP development aid 
relations began until the ECoD, and appropriate examples also from this span in the SSA states. 
 
Chapter 4 - European Union Development Aid 
This chapter of the project will be investigating the European Union’s development aid relation to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Initially, development aid and its connection to the EU will be demonstrated. 
We will then highlight the agreements and the important turns for the EU’s relations with the Sub-
Saharan states through their ACP cooperation, and also the emergence of normative values in these 
relations since its beginning with the Treaty of Rome. The chapter will conclude with an analysis 
of the European Consensus on Development, a joint declaration by the EU that guides EU’s 
development policies. 
 
Development Aid 
Aid may refer to any type of grant given from one country to another; usually from the 
developed/in the Northern hemisphere, to the developing/in the Southern hemisphere (Desai 
2009). The main purpose of aid throughout time has been the eradication of poverty (ibid.). 
Humanitarian aid, also called relief aid, is a temporary support to an immediate problem (ibid.). 
Military assistance was common during the Cold War, and the two superpowers were interested 
in gaining influence through aid, as well as supporting countries in their defense against the 
influence of "the other” superpower (Desai 2009, Lancaster 2007). Thus, aid was mostly a 
diplomatic tool (Lancaster 2007). The concept “development” emerged after the World War II as 
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poverty was deemed escapable (Willis & Kumar 2009). In the post-Cold War international sphere, 
development and norm promotion became significant factors in aid (Brown 2005).  
 
Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the OECD as: 
“those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to 
multilateral institutions which are: 
i.  provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies; and 
ii.  each transaction of which: 
a)  is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and 
 
b)  is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” (OECD 2008, p. 1) 
 
“Building countries’ capacity” and “focusing on the economic and social development of the 
recipient” are also mentioned by the DAC as important determinants of whether something may 
be defined as development aid (OECD 2008, p. 2). Holden argues that even if the ‘main objective’ 
mentioned by the DAC does not hold true, the OECD’s definition of development aid is still useful 
as it separates this type of aid clearly from e.g. military aid (Holden 2009, p. 21).  
 
European Development Aid 
 
The EU frequently mentions that it accounts for more than half of the world’s ODA (e.g. 
europa.eu:A) . This number is a combination of the aid given through EU institutions and the 
individual member states (ibid). Aid from the EU can thus be divided into two parts: aid from the 
EU institutions and aid from the member states of the EU. When the member states are left out, 
the EU still provides more than 10 percent of the ODA (Dearden 2002). Unlike the situation with 
agricultural and trade policies, the EU member states retain their own individual aid policies 
concurrently with the EU managed aid (Holden 2009).  
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EU’s development aid is mostly given through Europe Aid and is budgeted by the EU budget. The 
ACP countries’, and thus SSA, aid is provided by the European Development Fund (EDF), which 
is an intergovernmental body, where the main purpose are promoting structural intervention and 
liberalization (Bountagkidis et al., 2015). Established with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the 
European Development Fund (EDF) is a separate fund from the multiannual financial framework 
(MFF) of the EU, because its funding consists of voluntary contributions by the individual member 
states (EC 2014).The special relationship between certain member states and certain recipient 
countries were taken into consideration when funding the EDF since the Treaty of Rome (EC 
2014).  Whereas the EU budget is administered by the general financial regulations of the EU, the 
member states have direct influence on the management of the EDF budget (EC 2014). The budget 
comprises 30 percent of EU’s aid spending, and it is the main source of aid to ACP and OCT states 
(Gavas 2010, EC 2014). The other 70 percent of EU’s aid spending comes from the EU budget 
(EC 2014). Whereas this is administered by the general financial regulations of the EU, the EDF 
funding is carried out in accordance with the ACP-EU agreement, also known as the Cotonou 
agreement (ibid.). The member states have direct influence on the management of the EDF budget 
because there is an EDF committee which states its opinion before the EC and because the Cotonou 
agreement established a Joint Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Ministers and a Committee 
of Ambassadors with representatives or government members of ACP states (ibid.). Furthermore, 
the member states, not the EU, are signatories of the conventions between ACP and EU. However, 
it is a Commission department which administers the EDF (ibid.) 
 
The high influence of member states in the EDF, and the concurrent aid policies, might lead to 
questioning the actorness of the EU. However, the EU institutions account for more aid than any 
single member state (Gavas et al. 2014). As the amount of member states has increased, the 
Commission has gained more responsibility for management of aid (Holden 2009). Along with the 
introduction of common aid goals in the European Consensus on Development of 2006, the EU 
can definitely be argued to have an aid policy. Furthermore the EU institutions are represented in 
international bodies like the OECD Development Assistance Committee, meaning that its status 
as an aid-provider is acknowledged (oecd.org). Thus, the EU is an internationally recognised actor, 
and with common member policies, it has an even stronger aid position (Woolcock 2012). 
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European Union’s Relations with the African, Caribbean, Pacific Group States 
 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established a special relationship with European Union's “associated 
countries”, which were basically “colonies in the process of becoming independent” (Holden 2009, 
p. 32).  Since then, approximately every 5th year, new conventions and their revisions have 
progressed these relations further. 
 
The two Yaoundé conventions were signed between 18 African states and the 6 members of the 
EC in 1963 and 1969, and in essence, were seen as ‘a continuation of post-colonial relations’ (Hurt 
2003, p. 161). The EU aimed to provide technical, trade and financial cooperation to the former 
French colonies and Madagascar (Malik 2011). In these agreements, preferential trade agreements 
were provided to the African states, which meant that certain goods from Africa would gain duty 
free access to European markets (ibid).  
 
The first Lomé convention was signed by 49 ACP states and 6 members of the EEC. This 
agreement allowed the two parties to negotiate on a basis of equality of partners on trade and aid 
policies (Arts & Dickson 2006). ACP states were given non-reciprocal trade preferences, and the 
diminished income of export caused by price fluctuations were guaranteed to to be financed by the 
EDF, which was expanded (Holden 2009, Hurt 2003, Malik 2011). The later revisions of this 
agreement, however, adopted a more liberal understanding of development (Hurt 2003). The EU 
tried including aid for the provision of human rights as early as the negotiations for Lomé II, which 
was later integrated into Lomé III nominally (ibid.). However, in the 1990s with the signing of 
Lomé IV (1990) and its midterm review IVbis (1995), the EU and ACP’s economic relationship 
gained a political dimension (Malik 2011). The rules of respect for human rights and democracy 
had now become a condition for receiving aid from the EU, and several conditionalities and control 
initiatives were featured in these agreements to protect them (Olsen 2001). The policies, now based 
on performance, moved away drastically from the “partnership” principle of the earlier 
conventions.   
 
The 78 ACP (48 Sub-Saharan) states that signed the Cotonou agreement in 2000 with the then 15 
member states of the EU, were now assessed on their level of development and participation in 
EU foreign aid Group 25 Spring 2015 
26 
 
regional integration projects, along with observing respect for human rights, democracy, rule of 
law (Malik 2011).The ACP states were no longer provided with non-reciprocal trade preferences, 
except for the least developed which still had access, similar to that under Lomé. The Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were to replace earlier trade preferences, where the duty free 
access to the European/ACP markets could be negotiated (ibid.). In Cotonou, the successful 
utilization of aid in the economic and political spheres meant being more eligible for aid, as the 
special amounts of EDF that were previously earmarked for human rights promotion, adjustment 
support, project aid; had become easier to divert to those states who were efficiently using the aid 
(Malik 2011). 
 
Norms 
 
During the Cold War, values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights gained significance 
in Europe, as they distinguished west and east European politics (Manners 2002). Accordingly, in 
the immediate post-war period, “peace and liberty were … defining features of west European 
politics…” (ibid., p. 243). Donors expressed concern for the effectiveness of aid, for instance, in 
undemocratic and corrupt regimes of the recipient states (Hurt 2003). After the Cold War, 
European development policies started featuring democracy and human rights as crucial elements. 
Economic progress was increasingly linked to political freedom and democracy in such 
declarations (Olsen 2001). Olsen argues in an earlier paper that the inclusion of democracy and 
human rights both in trade and aid parts of the agreements was due to the fall of the Communist 
regimes, and the European belief that the Western political values were the best (1998). He points 
out, however that the disappearance of political and security purposes of aid with the ending of the 
Cold War, required ensuring popular support for aid by including these values, but also created 
politically acceptable arguments for cutting it (ibid.). In 1991 democracy and human rights were 
made conditions for receiving aid. Furthermore the Maastricht Treaty (1992) established 
democracy, rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms as objectives in development 
programmes (ibid.).  
The EU expresses that there is a link between the main aim of their development policies 
(eliminating poverty) and values such as good governance and human rights (Cotonou 2000, ECoD 
2006, ec.europa.eu:D, ec.europa.eu:E). In Cotonou, at the beginning of the millennium, the 
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essential elements that shaped the EU-ACP aid relations included human rights, rule of law and 
democracy; and now a fundamental element: good governance. 
 
Manners provides three explanations to the emergence of governance in the EU as a norm to 
promote: the resignation of the EU commission, double standards in democracy promotion and 
acknowledgement of governance in development (2002). In 1999, the 20 members of the EU 
commission resigned due to claims of fraud and mismanagement (Macmullen 1999). Hypocrisy 
in the promotion of democracy to former communist countries were identified, as the EU was not 
necessarily carrying out the things they suggested (Johns 2003). As explained above, the EU states 
clearly that they believe that governance underpins development goals. 
 
These values that defined the European politics at the time, were quickly externalized as they were 
considered important by the EU. In its strive for establishing dominance in international relations, 
the EU effectively incorporated the values of peace, liberty and democracy in the foreign policy. 
 
European Consensus on Development, 2006 
  
In 2006, the Commission on European Union, the European parliament and the Council signed a 
statement on a development policy, which is called the "European Consensus on Development”. 
The European Consensus is a development policy which defines common principles on which the 
EU and the Member States will base their development policies. 
The consensus contains EU’s vision of development and its implementation of Community 
development policy (ECoD 2006). The Consensus is the first formal statement where the EU has 
agreed on common aims for development cooperation, and was a move towards policy coherence 
(Woolcock 2012). 
The first part of the declaration consist of goals and principles which the Member States and the 
Community shares a vision of and is set to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 
(ECoD 2006).  
  
The European Consensus on Development begins by stating “Never before have poverty 
eradication and sustainable development been more important” (ECoD 2006, p. 1). It is thus from 
the beginning stated that the EU’s focus is on poverty eradication and sustainable development 
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when concerned with development aid. Right after, it is written in the statement that “Combating 
global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, 
prosperous and equitable world” (ibid., p. 1). The quote says combating global poverty is a moral 
obligation, which suggests that the EU wishes their development aid policies to have an idealistic 
angle. The idea of giving aid as a moral obligation is closely linked to idealism and that aid should 
be altruistic, which the rest of the sentence also indicates. In another quote they state: 
“Development policy is at the heart of the EU's relations with all developing countries” (ibid., p. 
1). This notion of development policy as being in the heart of EU’s relation with developing 
countries implies that development is the main goal, and will be favoured. 
In the third chapter of ECoD it is made clear that “The Member States and the Community are 
equally committed to basic principles, fundamental values and the development objectives agreed 
at the multilateral level”, which shows a move towards coherence. 
Also in the third chapter it is stated that “the 'European Consensus on Development' provides, for 
the first time, a common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its Member States and 
Community levels, in development co-operation”. In this statement it becomes even more clear 
that the different levels within the multilevel governance system of EU have agreed to specific 
values as to further synchronize the different aid policies on different EU levels and among 
member states. ECoD has made it possible to view the provision of development aid from all the 
different member states and Commission as one. This has increasingly been possible since the 
ECoD but it shall still be done with caution as there are many cases where this won’t apply. It 
highly depends on the research level of the project one is writing and in our case the focus is on 
broader aspects of the EU and not on specific cases in e.g. recipient countries where presence of 
development aid from certain member states are more evident. 
“We reaffirm that development is a central goal by itself; and that sustainable development 
includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental 
aspects” (ECoD, p. 2).  This is Article 7 from the Common Objectives part and it shows the link 
between development and normative values. It is explicitly expressed that they see development 
as including good governance and human rights and that these are seen as necessary for continued 
development. In the next article they write “EU is determined to work to assist the achievement of 
these goals” (ECoD, p. 2). Stating that EU is determined to achieve these goals (good governance, 
human rights etc.) implies that foreign aid relations should include the promotion of these values, 
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but despite this, they did not write that they have committed themselves to the achievement of 
these goals. The use of the word ‘determined’ rather than ‘committed’ might give the member 
states more flexibility in how they conduct their national foreign aid and thus enable them to 
choose another approach than promotion of normative values. In Article 42, the same values are 
mentioned: “The Community development policy will have as its primary objective the eradication 
of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the MDGs, as well as the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights, as defined in part I. At 
the Community level, these objectives will be pursued in all developing countries and applied to 
the development assistance component of all Community cooperation strategies with third 
countries” (ECoD, p. 8). In the end it is also written explicitly that these policies should be applied 
through all the levels of the EU in their relations towards recipient countries. This means that the 
normative values are the subject of externalization when it comes to foreign relations between the 
EU and third countries. 
“The Commission's experience on democracy promotion, human rights and nation-building is 
positive and will be further developed” (ECoD, p. 9). This phrase from Article 53 is important 
because it says that the Commission has had positive experience with the promotion of normative 
values, indicating that the prior emphasis on these values has been fruitful and therefore dedication 
to the promotion should continue. 
“The empowerment of women is the key to all development and gender equality should be a core 
part of all policy strategies.” (ECoD, p. 3) this quote clearly shows the EU also sees gender 
equality as primary for development. Article 19 is also about the promotion of gender equality.  
The 13th article in the third chapter is about the common values of the EU, it says “EU partnership 
and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, 
solidarity and justice.” (ECoD, p. 3). This article is the one where the promotion of normative 
values is most explicit. This article clearly shows that the norms and values identified by Manners 
in NPE and written about in the earlier chapters are to be included in EU foreign aid from member 
states as well as from the EU institutions. 
Article 17 is about political dialogue between multi level governance EU and recipient countries. 
Similar to prior articles it is concerned with the promotion of “respect for good governance, human 
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law” (ECoD, p. 4). The article differs from other 
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articles because other issues are addressed in the end, such as the “fight against corruption, the 
fight against illegal migration and the trafficking of human beings” (ECoD, p. 4). The fight against 
illegal migration stands out, as it does not comply with the idealist approach, or the normative 
values, but instead enforces a strategic interest, especially for the Southern European member 
states. The statement thus also includes a different and realist approach. 
 
Section 5 of Chapter 4 is about how the EU should address fragile states. They write that EU “will 
support the prevention of state fragility through governance reforms, rule of law, anti-corruption 
measures and the building of viable state institutions” and when dealing with post-crisis states 
they will be “aiming at rebuilding institutional capacities” (ECoD, p. 4). This part of the statement 
is different from the more idealistic promotion of norms because it has a more liberal perspective. 
The focus on rebuilding, strengthening institutions and governance is a part of the liberal view in 
aid policies and therefore the ECoD also incorporates liberal notions within their text. 
“The EU strongly supports a rapid, ambitious and pro-poor completion of the (…) EU-ACP 
Economic Partnership Agreements. (…) We will provide additional assistance to help poor 
countries build the capacity to trade. (…) The EU will maintain its work for properly 
sequenced market opening, especially on products of export interest for developing 
countries, underpinned by an open, fair, equitable, rules-based multilateral trading system 
that takes into account the interests and concerns of the weaker nations” (ECoD, p. 7).  
This long quote is from 36th article and is mainly about trade. It addresses the topic of trade as part 
of the aid relations with recipient countries. It is also written that they wish to help the poor 
countries with building up their trade capacity and that this should be done openly and based upon 
international trade rules. The inclusion of trade as part of the coherence policies towards recipient 
countries indicates that EU foreign aid might be externalized according to the ideas of MPE. 
“In addition, the Community strives to promote understanding of interdependence” (ECoD, p. 9). 
Within liberalism one of the main ideas is that increased interdependence will cause a reduction in 
conflicts among the interdependent countries. Therefore when the EU wishes to further promote 
interdependence they are actually committing to a liberal approach within foreign aid policies. 
“the Commission will aim to include migration and refugee issues in country and regional 
strategies and partnerships (…). It will support developing countries in their policies of 
management of migratory flows” (ECoD, p. 17).  Again in article 110 the policies concerning 
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migration appear. This time it is about how the EU will support the recipient countries in 
controlling migration flows and in the case of SSA much of the migration is towards EU member 
states. Therefore, this fits well with strategic interests of some member states. 
Article 115 says “The Community will consistently use an approach based on results and 
performance indicators. Increasingly, conditionality is evolving towards the concept of a 
‘contract’ based on negotiated mutual commitments formulated in terms of results” (ECoD, p. 
17). The article is different than prior articles because it includes an aspect of conditionality and 
that it will base its foreign aid approach on the results and performances of the recipient countries. 
This could mean that third countries which do not live up to the normative values the EU wishes 
to promote in the country, might face a change in aid. Since this article is not specific about which 
results and performances they are to be successful in, they could as well be focused on strategic 
interests such as migration flows or institution building as in the liberal approach. 
 
Chapter 5 - Cotonou agreement 
This chapter will investigate the Cotonou agreement. It will go through different points of the 
agreement in order to identify how the EU portrays the relationship with the ACP states. Content 
analysis will be applied in order to do this. Concurrently, a critical analysis of the portrayal will be 
conducted, identifying discrepancies in the words used to portray the relationship and the 
reasoning for actions, and the actual situation this leaves either partner in. Journal articles will be 
used to provide discussion of these points. 
 
By 2000, the Cotonou agreement was signed and it replaced all previous agreements. The 
agreement is to cover a 20-year period, no other agreement may impede it (Cotonou, p. 38-39). As 
it has not yet run its course, our project will focus only on this agreement.  
 
The main objective of the Cotonou agreement is poverty reduction, with development and 
economic integration as supplementary objectives, as seen by Article 1 in the agreement: 
“The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating 
poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (Cotonou 2000, p. 6). 
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The interests in the ACP-EU relations are presented in the Cotonou agreement in an idealist way. 
In the preamble of the agreement, it is stated that the cooperation is for “the greater well being of 
their [the ACP states’] population” (Cotonou 2000, p 5). This portrayal of the relationship is 
continued throughout the agreement, as aspects which are to be focused on are presented as 
furthering development or poverty eradication. This holds true for the values of e.g. democracy 
and human rights as the essential elements are described as interconnected with development. It 
is however also described when talking about economic policies and clearly stated that 
development is “interlinked and complementary” to trade and economic policies. Further 
examples can be seen in the following extracts of the text: 
 
“sound and sustainable economic policies are prerequisites for development” (Cotonou, p. 
5) 
“the principles of the market economy (…)contribute to achieving the objectives of the 
partnership” (ibid., p. 9) 
“The design of macroeconomic policies and structural adjustment programmes shall (...) 
ensure a positive impact on poverty reduction” (ibid., p. 15) 
“Cooperation will aim at the sustainable development of the tourism industry in ACP 
countries and sub-regions, recognising (..) the role it can play in poverty eradication” (ibid. 
p, 16) 
  
Thus, the work on economic policies is not necessarily mentioned as an objective of their own in 
the beginning of the agreement, but sometimes simply mentioned as matters that are necessary for 
achieving the main objectives of the agreement. Especially the use of the word “prerequisites” 
shows an approach that goes beyond simple linking. 
This portrayal of the motivations in the Cotonou agreement is consistent with EU’s general 
portrayal of its external relations. The EU has described its actions as solidary and beneficial to 
developing countries (Söderbaum et al. 2005). Bountagkidis et al. (2015) describe EU’s portrayal 
as a ‘normative power rhetoric’ and Söderbaum et al (2005) call it idealist. 
  
The idea that the market economy is necessary for poverty eradication may be argued to be a quite 
neoliberal point of view. Development has for a long time been associated with and measured by 
economic growth (Willis & Kumar 2009). The understanding that economic growth causes 
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increases in living standards for everyone has been criticised and the conception of development 
has been argued to be Eurocentric as it has implicitly defined development as developing countries 
gaining conditions that are similar to the First world countries’ (ibid.). The neoliberal approach to 
development has included the Structural Adjustment Programmes, meaning reduction of 
government spending, privatisation and free trade (ibid.). A focus on NGOs and communities 
facilitating development has also been argued to be a neoliberal result of reduction of state 
provisions (ibid.). 
Several neoliberal elements may be found in the agreement. The ideology is present in the focus 
on the private sector; for instance Chapter 7 of the agreement is called “Investment and private 
sector development support” and the private sector is mentioned more frequently than the public 
sector throughout the agreement (Cotonou 2000). The agreement also aims to support property 
rights, liberalisation of trade and privatisation of enterprises (ibid.).  Property rights are argued to 
be necessary for “equitable access to economic activities and productive resource” (ibid., p. 15). 
Hurt argues that the Lomé convention resulted in neoliberal understandings of concepts, and 
Cotonou is likely to do the same (2003). This ideological stand may determine when economic 
policies are defined as ‘sound and sustainable’. Brown argues that donors tend to see economic 
liberalisation as part of political liberalisation, and thus the ideology is not only confined to 
economic policies, but also to how political goals are defined (2005). 
 
The prioritisation of the overarching objectives is portrayed throughout the agreement where 
points are mentioned as they must not jeopardise the development, and action should be taken in 
a way that enables further development. This also holds true for the conditions mentioned, where 
sanctions should only be imposed to the extent that they support the further development. 
  
In section A, Article 75, emphasis is put on private investors to become a part of the development 
as well as following the objectives and priorities decided in the ACP-EU development cooperation. 
This section is different from the earlier neoliberal approach within the agreement as it limits the 
actions of private actors to the abide by the regulations and decisions made within the Cotonou 
agreement (Cotonou, p. 34). Section B, Article 75 says: 
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 “take measures and actions which help to create and maintain a predictable and secure 
investment climate as well as enter into negotiations on agreements which will improve 
such climate” (ibid.). 
This paragraph is important in an MPE perspective because it is an external conditionality, which 
is compelling all the parts to create secure and predictable investment climate for actors. Since the 
EU is already the world’s largest trading block (Van Rompuy 2010) they already have a predictable 
investment climate and therefore this section can be described as another condition which the 
recipient countries are to follow. Section F: 
“support efforts of the ACP States to attract financing with particular emphasis on private 
financing, for infrastructure investments and revenue generating infrastructure critical for 
the private sector” (Cotonou 2000). 
 is more specific in the promotion of market interests. The wish that investment has to be made 
with the goal of improving the infrastructure of the ACP countries, so that further private 
investments can be made in the specific country, can be seen as a way for the EU to improve local 
conditions for private actors, such as EU based firms, and thus help them generate profit. Section 
I has it as conditionality that the ACP and EU inform each other about issues that might be of 
relevance for the private sector and foreign direct investment. The foreign direct investment made 
by EU foreign aid can thus be used in creating better profit conditions for European firms due to 
conditionalities made in Article 75. 
  
Presented first as a force that generates economic development and development of trade, the 
article on maritime transport features some conditions on its liberalization: 
"They undertake to promote the liberalisation of maritime transport and to this end apply 
effectively the principle of unrestricted access to the international maritime transport 
market on a non-discriminatory and commercial basis” (Cotonou, p. 23). 
The third section of the Maritime Transport has it as a conditionality that each Party can have their 
ships freely operate at equal terms as their national ships in all ports of the other Party (ibid.). This 
expectation is similar to other examples in its portrayal of the terms as being equal for all partners 
but in reality the donor countries are the only ones who own the world fleet (UNCTAD, 2014). It 
can thus be argued that, as equality is provided on unequal terms, the EU is the one benefitting 
from this. The chapter on maritime transport is thus forcing the recipient countries to open their 
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ports to EU donor countries so products can be sold freely and undisturbed in the recipient's 
market. There is an argument that free-market conditionalities makes it difficult for the recipient 
countries to e.g. support the growth of a national trade fleet based on a protectionist policy because 
they are required to have a free market despite the developed countries gained wealth from this 
policy earlier (Chang 2014). This argument is one that will not be addressed further in this project 
as it is beyond the scope of this project. 
Article 77 also has several interesting aspects related to the externalization of MPE and 
expectations that benefit EU countries. The article says that investment guarantees will be 
employed to reduce risks, and cover foreign direct investors 
“against legal uncertainties and the major risks of expropriation, currency transfer 
restriction, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract” (Cotonou, p. 35). 
Another important part is that “Cooperation shall offer guarantees and assist with guarantees funds 
covering risks for qualified investment” (ibid., p. 35). Combined this means that the Cooperation 
between ACP-EU shall guarantee that the FDI made by donor countries or private companies 
won’t risk as much investing in the ACP countries. It is stated that it is for the purpose of boosting 
investor confidence in ACP countries which has to be seen as positive, but the beneficiaries of this 
might mostly be EU companies wanting to expand into ACP states. At the same time the article 
makes it possible that aid might be transferred towards foreign companies -  if these meet e.g. legal 
uncertainty or contract breach. 
 
Another trend in the agreement is the emphasis on sovereignty and participation of the ACP states. 
The states are to have control over their policies, which was criticized by Hurt, as the Cotonou 
agreement was in fact a further decrease of the partnership (2003). This is in part seen with the 
introduction of essential and fundamental elements as conditions. It is also clear from Article 12, 
which mentions situations where the EU may act in opposition to the ACP states interests; the 
Article explains that the EU must inform the partner states in due time and listen to their concerns, 
but also makes it clear that it may carry out the act either way: 
“If the Community does not accede to the ACP States’ submissions, it shall advise them as soon 
as possible giving its reasons” (Cotonou p. 10) 
  
Article 76 has the same notions as Article 75 but is different in section A where it is written that 
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“grants for financial and technical assistance to support policy reforms (…) institutional capacity-
building or other forms of institutional support” (Cotonou, p. 34). 
Financial and technical assistance should be used to promote liberal ideas of reform with the 
purpose of promoting institutional capacity-building and institutions in general. Several other 
articles also have liberal concepts within, in Article 79 “long-term institution building (ibid., p. 36) 
are to be conducted by the ACP states and Article 77 is another example of the wish for 
strengthening institutions but this time with the purpose of “reducing commercial risks for 
investors” (ibid., p. 35). 
  
Furthermore, the EU has been criticised for referring to the WTO agreements as the reason for 
certain alignment with policies (Bountagkidis 2015). The referral is present e.g. in Article 34 which 
mentions that the objectives for economic cooperation should be “in full conformity with the 
provisions of the WTO” and in Article 46 where the parties “underline the importance, in this 
context, of adherence to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) to the WTO Agreement” in relation to property rights (Cotonou, p. 20). However, as 
Bountagkidis argues, the EU has been part of promoting the WTO policies, and are capable of, 
especially in cooperation with the ACP states, of altering these rules. This points to the fact that 
the description of the objectives, motivations and interests in the agreement does not necessarily 
reflect reality (Bountagkidis, 2015). In Article 120 from ECoD it is also written that “In order to 
enhance the effectiveness of multilateral aid, the Community will also enhance its cooperation 
with (...) International Financing Institutions” (ECoD, p. 18). In this article the most significant 
aspect is the that the Community will enhance the cooperation with international financial 
institutions, maybe like WTO, which it already possesses power over and this is done for the 
effectiveness of multilateral aid.  
  
With the introduction of EPAs, the ’new’ trading dynamic, the EU seems to take the ACP states’ 
transition from preferential trade agreements into consideration. The need for a preparatory period 
is expressed, during which the Parties can negotiate the new trading agreements, and public and 
private sector capacities in ACP can be enhanced. Repeated in several articles, respecting WTO 
provisions is expected of the ACP states, however not much else can be identified as a condition 
to qualify for aid. “The level of development and the socio-economic impact of trade measures on 
EU foreign aid Group 25 Spring 2015 
37 
 
ACP countries, and their capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalization process” 
is highlighted to consider prior to trade agreements, seemingly in favor of the ACP (Cotonou p 
21). The hardships faced by the ACP states when fulfilling their obligations, and their individual 
levels of development are recognized once more in Article 39. 
  
The two last important articles are 83 and 96. Article 83 and 96 says that   
“The Council of Ministers shall at least once a year examine whether the objectives of 
development finance cooperation are being attained and shall examine the general and 
specific problems resulting from the implementation of that cooperation” (Cotonou, p. 
36). 
“If (…) a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming 
from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law (…), it shall, 
except in cases of special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers with 
the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view 
to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. To this end, it shall invite the other Party 
to hold consultations that focus on the measures taken or to be taken by the party 
concerned to remedy the situation” (Cotonou p 40). 
This means that every year the Council of Ministers are to examine if the recipient countries are 
following the conditionalities agreed upon in the Cotonou Agreement and if violations of 
normative values are being conducted they should be met with measures that are to change the 
direction of the state. Which measures used for this are not explicitly written in the agreement and 
if violations of market interests will be met with measures.  
 
Chapter 6 - EU’s commitment to aid relations 
This chapter investigates to what extent the EU has been committed to the promotion of the aid 
policies of the Cotonou agreement and the ECoD . It will specifically look into the essential 
elements by investigating the promotion of democracy. Democracy was chosen because it is a 
normative value mentioned in both the ECoD and the Cotonou agreement, and because democracy 
has been included as a political conditionality in all EU agreements with third parties since 1995 
(Holden 2009). Furthermore, there is a great amount of literature available for this topic. This 
chapter will look into three main explanations for inconsistencies in commitment to 
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conditionalities as identified by Brown (2005) and Biondo (2011): Economic interest, security 
interests and aid effectiveness. 
 
The EU has taken action in cases of violation of the essential elements of the Lomé and Cotonou 
agreements several times, both in Sub-Saharan Africa and in other ACP states, and in cases of 
democracy as well as human rights or rule of law violations (Mackie and Zinke 2005 and Santiso 
2003). In 1996 aid to Niger was suspended following a military coup, which was deemed a breach 
of the ‘democracy clause’ (Santiso 2003). In Côte d’Ivoire consultations were carried out after the 
military coup in 1999 and electoral assistance was temporarily suspended when there were 
democratic problems in the elections of the following year (ibid). 
 
Action can be taken with reference to Article 96 of the Cotonou agreement, which allows 
consultation procedure to take place if one of the parties violate one of the essential elements of 
the agreement (Cotonou 2000). If the consultation is unsuccessful, it can lead to a possible 
suspension of development cooperation between the two parties. 
 
However there have been inconsistencies in the application of this article. Brummer and Smith 
argue that sanctions are imposed in countries such as the Sub-Saharan countries, because they are 
weak and not of economic interest or security interest to the EU (Brummer 2009; Smith 2001 cited 
in Biondo 2011). As such, the EU is likely to prioritise their own interests over the goal and 
regulations of the aid programme. However, there are also cases in SSA where the EU has not 
imposed sanctions. Biondo investigates 5 cases where the EU has not invoked Article 96 in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Biondo 2011). The countries used are Nigeria, Chad, Kenya, Rwanda and 
Ethiopia. All of them have had democracy problems identified by the EU  shown by either an 
observer mission or, in the case of Chad, statements from the EU where they note democratic 
problems (ibid). 
Biondo identifies 4 different reasons for the lack of action in the countries: economic interests, 
political-historical interests, security interests and a development vs. democratisation dilemma 
(Biondo 2011). Brown also argues that security interests and economic interests may trump 
interests in democracy as well as identifying practical issues of conditioning aid (Brown 2005). 
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The political-historical interests include former colonial ties, however they will not be considered, 
as they are not within the scope of this study.  
 
Economic 
 
The economic interests have been identified as being prioritised over democracy by several 
scholars (Biondo 2011). However Biondo argues that in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa the 
economic interests are not as relevant, as only South Africa, Nigeria and Angola are important 
Sub-Saharan economies (ibid.). Since South Africa has a separate bilateral programme with the 
EU and not all provisions of the Cotonou agreement applies to it, it can be counted out (Holden 
2009, europa.euB, Biondo 2011). The view that SSA is not economically relevant to the EU is 
supported by Holden, who mentions that the ACP states after the removal of South Africa are a 
collection of economically weak developing countries; and by Woolcock, who argues that the EU 
does not have strong economic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa ( Holden 2009, Woolcock 2012).  
 
Security 
 
Olsen (2000) argues that “whenever there is a conflict between security and democracy, the 
Europeans tend to give priority to security” (cited in Biondo 2011). According to Biondo, this 
opinon is held by most scholars (ibid). 
Young (2004) argues that donors do not react on lack of democracy when the countries are 
stabilisers in the Horn of Africa (cited in Brown 2005). This is confirmed by Biondo who argues 
that Ethiopia’s role in Somalia’s democratic transition and Kenya’s anti-piracy support make them 
important stabilisers. This, she argues, means that SSA has relevant security interest. However, 
according to Brown, security interests are not as prevalent as in e.g. the MENA region (Brown 
2005). Security interests are also present in the Cotonou agreement as explained in Chapter 5. 
Security interests represent a realist perspective. 
 
The security interests are linked to concerns of stability. 
Santiso argues that “while democracy and modernization generate political stability, the process 
of democratizing and modernizing often breeds uncertainty and instability” (Santiso 2003, p. 154). 
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According to Brown, political stability is important to donors and they are likely to settle for this 
rather than democracy (Brown 2005). 
 
Aid effectiveness 
 
The EU argues, as explained in Chapter 5 on the Cotonou agreement, that democracy. human 
rights, rule of law and good governance (the essential elements) are prerequisites for development. 
However, Biondo argues that only the technocratic governance is needed for aid to be managed 
(Biondo 2011). Technocratic governance includes: “low corruption, low regulatory burden, strong 
government effectiveness and an adequate legal environment for the private sector” (ibid., p. 389). 
This means that if a country does not have serious corruption aid may still have a great and positive 
effect, even though it is an authoritarian state. According to Biondo this can explain why the EU 
has not acted upon faulty democracy in two of the five cases, which have great development scores 
- she calls this a democracy vs development dilemma (Biondo 2011). 
Brown also argues that prioritising political conditionalities may have negative effects on 
development projects, as it causes instability, and obstructs planning (Brown 2005). Thus, he also 
identifies a trade-off between the different goals. This is linked to EU’s dedication not to make 
changes that will obstruct the achievement of the main objectives as shown in their explanation of 
how to apply Article 96: “In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which 
least disrupt the application of this agreement” (Cotonou, Article 96, p 40). This explanation of 
inconsistencies is a more idealist perspective, elevating EU’s concern of the recipient country’s 
gain over the concern of EU’s interest. 
However, it is in contrast to the EU’s explanation that democracy, as one of the essential elements, 
is not involved in any trade-off, but in fact furthers the goal of development, as explained in 
Chapter 2 on the Cotonou agreement. 
 
Other considerations of effectiveness: 
Brown notes some general problems of using political conditionality, which may also discourage 
a country from imposing sanctions. It is complicated to measure political achievements and unclear 
what the negative effects of imposing sanctions will be, as well as at which specific point to 
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withdraw aid, resume aid etc. (Brown 2005). Besides, the process is expensive and complicated 
(ibid.). 
 
Biondo clearly shows that there are inconsistencies in the EU’s commitment to political conditions. 
Economic interests of the EU are often criticised, but do not bear as much relevance in SSA as in 
other areas. Security interests are relevant and bring a realist perspective in stark contrast to the 
idealist and liberalist position expressed by the EU in the Cotonou agreement. However, problems 
of prioritising different aspects of development programmes, may also play in, as a stabilised 
country with low corruption may be able to run effective development in some areas despite a 
faulty democracy. Evidence of this is a contrary point to EU’s description of democracy as 
necessary for development. Whether the inconsistencies are carried out in concern of EU’s self-
interests or for aid-effectiveness, they bring a contrast to the idealism portrayed in the inclusion of 
the conditionalities. The prioritisation of effectiveness may show normative concerns, but do also 
indicate that the portrayal of democratisation as a prerequisite for development is not actually 
driven by a concern for effectiveness, but certainly puts the EU in a position where they can 
withdraw aid if they disagree with developments - while choosing not to withdraw it when it is in 
their favour. 
    
Conclusion   
In light of the previous chapters, where we have provided the reader with information on the 
European Union’s development policies, including the analyses of European Consensus on 
Development and Cotonou Agreement, we will now try to conclude on the findings of our research.  
 
Various articles provide different motives that shape the long-running and far-reaching history of 
cooperation between the EU and SSA states. Moving on from the legacies of colonial ties, the 
cooperation has progressed and expanded since, covering both trade and aid aspects of the 
relationship. The mostly non-reciprocal and preferential terms provided for the SSA states in the 
earlier stages of the cooperation were replaced with the normative values and conditionalities in 
the post-Cold War era. These adjustments, which required the ACP states to improve their 
conditions as seen fit by the EU, were influenced by the fall of the Communist regimes, the 
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disappearance of bipolarity of the world and therefore security interests as primary. Our project 
has investigated the changing interests and the driving factors of the EU to incorporate these values 
into its agreements and declarations since then.  
 
In the ECoD we identify a strong normative focus that is very similar to that of NPE. The 
Consensus declares that the normative values are of major importance in aid relations and that 
without these, the overall main goal of poverty reduction will not be successful. The idealistic 
notions of the ECoD suits Manners’ theory of NPE. The idea that EU is externalizing normative 
values through informational instruments in the ECoD is clear as both the member states and 
European Commission are committed to this agreement. The Cotonou agreement also shares the 
normative values of ECoD and since this agreement is one that is applied for all ACP countries it 
shows a strong normative basis of the EU, commonly transferring their normative values upon 
ACP states rather than allowing inconsistencies in values between different states. At the same 
time our analysis of the documents showed that MPE and liberalism is also evident. The ECoD is 
mostly about the normative values and less about specific market interests of the EU. Despite this, 
the market relations are seen in the wish for building up the recipient countries’ trade capacity, 
maybe as a way to externalize MPE. Liberalism’s notions of institutions and interdependence are 
also addressed in the document, as well as the issue of migration, which tends to be more security 
oriented and realist. In the Cotonou agreement, despite having normative values as the main 
conditionality where aid sanctions can be applied at the recipient countries, the biggest focus is on 
market relations between ACP-EU. The similarity between the ECoD (EU’s own) and the Cotonou 
agreement (between EU and ACP) indicate that the EU externalises its internal policies and 
regulations. The analysis of the many different articles within the Cotonou agreement also show 
that the EU tends to externalize many of the same regulations they have internally within market 
relations. Their focus on free and fair trade as being conducted through the specific expectations, 
such as equal maritime transport access and institution building, makes it possible for the EU to 
externalize MPE ideas of e.g. institutions that enforces market regulations so the interdependency 
can be increased.  
 
The EU mostly portrays its aid relations as idealist, while analysis of specific policy details show 
a more market-oriented approach within aid relations. Their focus on market regulations, local 
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institutions, NGOs etc. signal MPE as a factor that is hidden behind their NPE portrayal, which 
may allow them to act freer. 
 
Lastly in our project, we have attempted to look beyond the agreements by assessing commitment 
using the example of Article 96 and democracy promotion. From this, it seems that the EU is not 
in reality as committed to enforcing normative values as the analysed documents indicate. 
Economic and security interests tend to be given as explanation for inconsistencies in commitment, 
indicating that market power and liberal and realist approaches are more at play than a normative 
basis. Concerns of aid effectiveness provide an alternative explanation, which to some extent is 
more in line with the EU’s idealist argumentation and ‘normative power rhetoric’. However, if the 
EU is allowing breach of the essential elements in order to protect development, the rationale for 
the conditionality is undermined; the values are prioritised as essential elements because they are 
prerequisites for development. Bearing this in mind, inconsistencies represent prioritisation of 
EU’s interest over development goals or an indication that political conditionalities are means to 
consolidate control and can be used when the EU deems it appropriate.  
 
Conclusively we argue that the EU’s development aid policies is not always a realization of the 
normative rhetoric, but is instead primarily shaped by market interests.  
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